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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CORPORATION, a
New York corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.,

Case No. 18972

Defendants.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Cross-claimants,
vs.
TYE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH, et al.,
Cross-defendants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/CROSS DEFENDANT
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action by plaintiff, Kennecott Corporation, challenging the constitutionality of two tax
statutes passed by the Utah Legislature in 1981.

Defendant,

Salt Lake County, counterclaimed against plaintiff, alleging
that plaintiff's mining property had been undervalued and
that some of its property had escaped valuation.

Salt Lake

County also filed crossclaims against the Utah State Tax Com-

mission in which it contested certain valuation techniq11<
employed by the Commission and in which it sought review ol
confidential Commission records.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
Following a hearing on motions for summary judgment filed
by plaintiff and the State Tax Commission with respect to
Salt Lake County's counterclaim and crossclaims, the lower
court granted judgment in favor of plaintiff and the Commission.

The court ruled that Salt Lake County did not have

standing to maintain any of its causes of action and dismissed the county's claims against respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, seeks affirmance
of the lower court's judgment of dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF CLAIMS
For purposes of appeal, the facts in the present case are
essentially as set forth in appellants' brief and relate primarily to the claims asserted by the parties and the proceedings before the lower court.

However, some clarification is

necessary in order to summarize fully the position of the
State Tax Commission before the lower court.
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i\ppellants, Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake county
rr2cis1ner and the Salt Lake County Assessor (hereinafter the
"County"), asserted two claims for relief against the Utah
rax Com:nission (hereinafter the "Commission").

Their first

cause of action alleged that the Commission had undervalued
plaintiff's mining properties and that the court should issue
an order requiring the Commission to disregard the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated § 59-5-57 (1953, as amended), relating
to the procedures for valuing certain mining properties, and
to revalue the property of Kennecott Corporation (hereinafter
"Kennecott")

for each of the past five years.

The County

further sought a judgment declaring that Section 59-5-57 of
the Utah Code was unconstitutional.

The second cause of

action requested the court to order the Commission to maintain a book of mines and to supply to the County, upon
request, all information relating to the valuation of stateassessed property within the County.

Appellants' counter-

claim against Kennecott alleged that Kennecott's property had
been undervalued by the Commission and that Kennecott should
be ordered to pay an additional tax based upon a proper
value.

The basic issues raised by this appeal, therefore,

are whether a county has standing to challenge a property
valuation required by statute to be made by the Commission
and to audit Commission records in cases where a taxpayer
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appeals to the courts from that valuation, and whether a
county has the right to seek a court order requiring the c 0
mission to increase the assessed value of the taxpayer's
property.
In this regard, the Commission took the position before
the lower court that the counties and their agencies and
officers, as well as other political subdivisions and agencies of the state, could sue only within the framework of
specific powers granted to them by the Utah Constitution or
by the legislature.

Since there is no specific grant of

power to the County to assert the above claims, the Commission maintained that appellants had no standing to assert
them in this or any other action.

The Commission also con-

tended that the County was not entitled to maintain its
second cause of action for the additional reason that both
the taxpayer's constitutional right of privacy and the Utah
Archives and Records Service Information Practices Act precluded disclosure to the County of the above information.
The Commission did not assert that the relationship between
the Commission and the County was equivalent to that of a
•servant-master" as stated by the County in its brief.
(Brief of Appellants, page 7).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THB COUNTY LACKS STANDING TO MAINTAIN ANY
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE UTAH TAX COMMISSION IN THE PRESENT ACTION,
A.

Utah Constitution and Statutes.

With respect to each of the County's causes of action, a
review of applicable law shows that to grant the relief requested by appellant would give powers to the counties, which
neither the framers of the Utah Constitution nor the legislature ever intended the counties to have.

It would further

usurp express constitutional and statutory powers of the Tax
Commission.

Article XIII, Section 11, of the Utah Constitu-

tion provides for the creation of the Commission and requires
the Commission to administer and supervise the tax laws of
the state, to assess or value mines and public utilities, and
to adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment among the
several counties.

Section 59-5-3 of the Utah Code Annotated

also specifically requires the Commission to assess pipelines, power lines and plants, canals and irrigation works,
bridges and ferries, car and transportation companies operating in more than one county, and mines and mining claims.
(These classes of property will be referred to throughout
this brief as "state-assessed property".)

It then provides

that taxable property not required by the Constitution or by
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law to be assessed by the Commission must be assessed by
county assessor of the county in which the property is situ
ated.

(Such property is hereinafter ref erred to as "county-

assessed property".)

Thus, the Constitution and state law

specifically provide that certain kinds of taxable property,
including property owned by Kennecott, is to be assessed by
the Commission, and that the duty of the counties with
respect to assessment of taxable property is limited to
assessment of those properties within their boundaries, which
is not assessed by the Commission.
With respect to the Commission's constitutional duty to
administer and supervise the tax laws of the state, Utah Code
Annotated, S 59-5-46(9)

(1953, as amended) requires the Com-

mission to exercise general supervision "over assessors and
over county boards in the performance of their duties as
county boards of equalization and over other county officers
in the performance of their duties in connection with the
assessment of property and collection of taxes."

The nature

and extent of the Commission's power and authority are also
seen in Section 59-5-47, which provides:
The State Tax Commission shall adjust and equalize
the valuation of the taxable property in the several
counties of the state for the purpose of taxation:
and to that end it may of its own initiative order
or make an assessment or reassessment of any property which it deems to have been overassessed or
underassessed or which it finds has not been
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. . .
fN]o county board of equalization
or assessor shall have any power to change any
assessment so fixed by the State Tax Commission.
The overall responsibility for administration of the
state's tax laws and, in particular, for assessment of taxable property, therefore, rests with the Commission.

It is

the only state agency that is charged with the statutory
responsibility of ensuring that the counties carry out their
duties properly in this regard.

The reasons for this dis-

tinction between the constitutional and statutory powers of
the Commission and the counties are based on a clear legislative recognition of a need for administrative efficiency and
order in the taxation of all property throughout the state.
The procedures for taxing real property could not be carried
out effectively or economically if the counties had the right
to sue the Commission or challenge its action in all cases
where a county disagrees with the Commission's valuations,
policies or procedures.

Only the legislature can grant such

a right after careful review of appropriate safeguards, the
need to provide funding for additional personnel and expert
witnesses, and similar considerations.
In contrast to the above specific constitutional and
statutory requirements, the county now seeks to turn the
above procedures and laws upside down and to supervise and
direct the Commission in the performance of its constitution-
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al and statutory duties with respect to the assessment of all
taxable property throughout the state.

Its approach first 1,

to require not only reassessment of state-assessed propertieo
in Salt Lake County, but a change in the statutory method set
forth in Section 59-5-57 by which certain mining properties
are assessed statewide.

Second, the County seeks access to

all information relating to such assessments required to be
made exclusively by the Commission so that it can look over
the shoulder of the Commission as it performs its constitutional duties.

In short, as reflected by its brief, the

County seeks a court appointment as "watchdog" over the Commission.

(Brief of Appellants, pages 19-20).

Under state law governing appellants' claims, there are
only two avenues by which parties may challenge assessments
made by the Commission on property which it is required to
assess by law.

First, Utah Code Annotated, S 59-11-11 (1953,

as amended) provides that a taxpayer may pay under protest a
tax with which he disagrees and then bring an action in court
to recover the amount paid under protest.

Kennecott's action

in the present case was brought under this provision.

The

provision would also permit an owner of county-assessed property or a group of such owners to bring an action in district
court to challenge valuation procedures of the Commission and
to obtain a refund if those procedures result in the payment
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.,f a greater tax due to undervaluation of state-assessed

property.

Alternatively, a property owner dissatisfied with

dn assessment made by the Commission may apply to the Commission for correction of the assessment, and the Commission
will then set a time to hear the objection.
Annotated, § 59-7-13

(1953, as amended).

Utah Code

If a taxpayer is

dissatisfied with the decision of the Commission, he may then
appeal to the tax division of the appropriate district court
for review of the Commission's decision or, in the alternative, may apply for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court.

§

59-24-2.

Under both procedures, the only party

for whom provision is made for appeal of an assessment made
by the Commission on state-assessed property is the taxpayer
himself; there is no provision made for such an appeal by a
county, its officers or agencies.
Additionally, state law provides no rights to the counties and their officers and agencies with respect to the book
of mines referred to in Section 59-5-56 of the Utah Code, and
makes no provision for any person or entity, other than the
Commission, to have any access whatsoever to the information
sought by appellants' second cause of action.

Indeed, as

will be discussed below, the Archives and Records Service
Information Practices Act expressly prohibits the dissemination of such information.
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In summary, the Commission is vested with the exclusi
constitutional and statutory power and authority to valuP
state-assessed property.

As to such property, neither the

Utah Constitution nor state statutes give the counties any
responsibility, powers or authority whatever.

Section

59-5-46(9) expressly grants to the Commission general supervisory powers over the administration of the tax laws of the
state, including assessors and county boards in the performance of their duties, and over other county officers in connection with the assessment of property and collection of
taxes.

Section 59-5-47 of the Utah Code states specifically

that the counties have no power to change any reassessments
made by the Commission of county-assessed property.

A simi-

lar limitation should apply to cases in which a county claims
it has power to challenge the Commission's valuation of
state-assessed property.
B.

The Courts Have Refused to Grant Standing to Counties to Sue Under Similar Circumstances.

Counties and other political subdivisions of a state have
only such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by
statute or by the state constitution and those which are
reasonably and necessarily implied therefrom.
Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980)

1

State v.

Gardner v. Davis

County, 523 P. 2d 865 (Utah 1974); Cottonwood City Electors v.
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dt

Lake County Bd. of Com'rs, 499 P.2d 270 (Utah 1972);
Johnson v. Sandy City Corp., 497 P.2d 644 (Utah

1972); Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 2B4 P.2d 702 (Utah
1955); Salt Lake City v. Revene, 124 P.2d 537 (Utah 1942).
This rule is particularly applicable where the public
treasury is directly affected.

Barendregt v. Walla Walla

School District No. 140, 611 P.2d 13B5 (Wash. App. 19BO);
State ex rel. Bain v. Clallam County Board of County Commissioners, 463 P.2d 617 (Wash. 1970).

In addition, county com-

missions and county officials have only such powers as are
specifically enunciated by law and those which are reasonably
and necessarily implied in order to discharge their responsibilities.

Gardner v. Davis County, 523 P.2d B65 (Utah 1974);

Cottonwood City Electors v. Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, 499 P.2d 270 (Utah 1972).
While it may be argued that Utah Code Annotated,
§

17-4-3(1)

(1953, as amended) grants counties power to sue

and be sued, this is not a blanket power to sue under all
circumstances.

As stated by this Court in Shaw

v. Salt Lake

County, 224 P. 2d 1037, 103B (Utah 1950):
Section 19-4-3, u.c.A. 1943 [the predecessor of
u.c.A., s 17-4-3], covering the general powers of
counties indicates that "A County has power: (1) To
sue and be sued." This, however, is but a general
grant constituting the county an entity to sue and
be sued, where it may under other applicable
statutes or principles, properly be sued or sue.
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Accordingly, without specific constitutional or statutory
power to sue for a particular kind of relief, the counties
and their officials have no standing or authority to do so.
The specific question of whether a county has standing to
sue the Commission to challenge an assessment made by the
Commission or to test the constitutionality of a statute
under which the Commission has performed its constitutional
duties does not appear to have been raised in any reported
decision of this Court.

However, the question of standing

was addressed by the Court briefly in response to a recent
petition filed in the cases of Beaver County, et al. v. Utah
State Tax Commission, Case Nos. 18672, 18673, and 18674
(1982) , in which all 29 Utah counties sought an order of this
Court, requiring the Commission to permit the counties to
intervene in several taxpayer appeals before the Commission.
In each of those cases, a railroad company had appealed from
the Commission's valuation of its property.

The Commission

moved to dismiss the counties' petitions because the valuation of state-assessed property was the exclusive statutory
responsibility of the Commission and the counties lacked
standing to challenge those valuations.

In a notice of deci-

sion dated October 22, 1982, the Court stated that •defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, petitioners being without standing to intervene.•
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The Court's ruling in Beaver County is consistent with
court decisions of neighboring states, which have held unanimously that counties and their officials have no standing or
authority to bring such lawsuits.

In Board of County Com-

missioners of County of Delores v. Love, 470 P.2d 861 (Colo.
1970), for example, the plaintiffs, who were county officials, claimed that the State Board of Equalization and the
Colorado Tax Commission had abused their discretion in
reviewing property appraisals of the Delores County Assessor
and in ordering reappraisals of county properties.

The

Colorado Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint,
holding that the plaintiff county officials had neither
standing nor legal authority to maintain their action.
The principles relied upon by the Court in Board of
County Commissioners in reaching its decision are generally
the same as those set forth under Point I above and apply
equally to the County's claims in the present case.

First,

the Court noted that a county is not an independent governmental entity, but rather a political subdivision of the
state, existing only for the convenient administration of
state government and created to carry out the will of the
state.
cers, as

Further, the counties and their agencies and offisubdivisions of the state, possess only

such powers as are expressly conferred upon them by the
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constitution and statutes and such incidental and irnpliel
powers as are reasonably necessary to carry out their
powers.

The Court found that in Colorado (as in Utah) no

statutory or constitutional provision grants any express or
implied powers to counties or county agencies or officials to
challenge the findings, orders or other action of a State Tax
Commission.

Therefore, the Court held that the counties had

no standing to maintain such action.
The second point made in Board of County Commissioners is
that the general grant of power to the counties to sue
relates to the county's function as a body corporate and can
only be exercised within the framework of the specific powers
granted counties and boards of county commissioners.
not grant a general power to sue in all situations.

It does
The

position of the Colorado Supreme Court in this regard is consistent with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Shaw v.
Salt Lake County, 224 P. 2d 1037, 1038 (Utah 1950), as discussed above.
Third, the Court in Board of County Commissioners held
that county commissioners or agencies do not have authority
to sue as representatives of the taxpayers of their counties.

The Arizona Supreme Court in Town of Chino Valley v.

State Land Department, 580 P. 2d 704 (Ariz. 1978), also stated
that municipalities were a creation of the state and were not
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a1npowered to invoke the personal rights of its citizens
against the state.
Finally, the Court in Board of County Commissioners
emphasized that a ministerial officer, such as an assessor,
is required to obey the act of a tribunal in directing his
action, and may not question or decide upon its validity.
The Court stated that an assessor has no more standing to
question the validity of the action of a state board of
equalization than a lower court has to question the validity
of the mandate of a reviewing Court.

That principle should

apply with equal force in the present case to prevent the
counties from challenging the action of the Commission, particularly in view of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-5-46(9),
which expressly provides that the Commission is to exercise
general supervision over county assessors and county boards
of equalization.
In the later case of Adams County Board of County Commissioners v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 525 P.2d 1202
(Colo. App. 1974), the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a
county assessor and a county board of commissioners had
neither standing nor authority to seek review of a decision
of the State Board of Assessment Appeals (the successor
agency to the Colorado Tax Commission) •

As in Board of

County Commissioners, the Court explained that the county
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assessor and county board of commissioners were precluded
from challenging a decision of the State Board of Assessmen1
Appeals without specific legislation granting them the power
to do so.

Although Adams does not deal specifically with the

question of whether a county has standing to challenge valuation procedures used by a State Tax Commission, the principle
that counties cannot exceed their statutory authority is
equally applicable to the present case.
In Petit v. Board of Tax Appeals, 538 P.2d 501 (Wash.
1975), the Supreme Court of Washington also held that a

county assessor was not entitled to judicial review of a
decision of the State Board of Tax Appeals.

The Court ex-

plained that parties entitled to such review were limited to
those expressly given that right by statute.

Therefore, only

taxpayers and not tax assessors were entitled to seek judicial review of a Board of Tax Appeals decision.

Similarly,

in King County v. Washington State Board of Tax Appeals, 622
P.2d 898 (Wash. App. 1981), the Washington Court of Appeals
held that a county and its assessor lack standing to seek a
statutory writ of certiorari to challenge a Board of Tax
Appeals decision.

Again the Court reached this decision on

the ground that a county's powers are limited to those expressly or impliedly derived from the legislature:
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The appellants argue that the BTA [Board of Tax
Appeals] rulings infringe on the county's constitutionally recognized power to collect taxes.
The
appellants concede that this taxing power is derived
only from legislative grant.
They contend, however,
that, once this grant has been made, the county has
a sufficient interest in defending its taxing power
to allow it to seek review of BTA decisions that
limit it.
Appellants do not mention that a grant of
taxing power does not confer an absolute right to
collect property taxes free from state interference.
The actions of the assessor are subject to
state supervision.
Furthermore, the State "can take
away not only the power to tax, but the subjects of
taxation as well.
No person or municipality can
acquire, as against the state, a vested right to
tax. • •
" Authority to make omitted value assessments, the primary issues in these cases, is not a
constitutional right of the assessor, but is derived
from [state statutes].
The BTA has authority to
decide appeals from a county board of equalization
under [a state statute] and was thus empowered to
rule against the appellants in these cases. [Citations omitted]
Id. at 901.
Other courts, based on similar considerations, have held
that a county and its officers may not challenge the constitutionality of a state statute without specific statutory
authority to do so.

Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne,

618 P. 2d 1374 (Colo. 1980); Board of County Com.missioners of
Boulder County v. 5lst General Assembly of the State of
Colorado, 599 P.2d 887 (Colo. 1979); Denver Association for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1, 535 P.2d
200 (Colo. 1975).

This rule was explained in Denver Urban
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Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Colo.

\'J8111

as follows:
A longstanding rule of law is that political
subdivisions of the state, and the officers thereof,
lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of
a state statute directing the performance of their
duties. This rule has been applied to counties,
county officials, and county agencies; and also has
been applied with respect to school districts. The
rationale for this rule is that [p]ublic policy and
public necessity require prompt and efficient action
from [ministerial officers of the state. J It has
similarly been noted that subordinate state political subdivisions, or their officers, may not challenge a state statute unless expressly or impliedly
empowered to do so. Board of
Commissioners
v. r..ove [discussed above], wherein it also stated
that such political subdivisions of the state exist
only for the convenient administration of the state
government, created to carry out the will of the
state.
[Citations omitted]
For the reasons stated by the courts in the above decisions, appellants in the present case lack standing to challenge not only the valuations made by the Commission, but
also the constitutionality of Section 59-5-57 of the Utah
Code.

The same reasoning compels a finding that the County

lacks standing to maintain its second cause of action, which
seeks an order requiring the Commission to maintain a book of
mines and to give Salt Lake County all information, including
informational returns filed by plaintiff and all other owners
of state-asessed property located in Salt Lake county.
Appellants have not cited any cases or other authority in
which the issue of standing was raised and in which a county
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or county official was granted standing to challenge in court
" State Tax Commission decision or procedure, absent a specific statutory grant of power to do so.
The Utah Constitution and state statutes expressly provide that the Commission has exclusive authority to value
state-assessed property.

County-assessed properties, in con-

trast, are valued by the counties.

Again, it is significant

for purposes of this appeal, that the Commission is required
by law to supervise the counties in the performance of their
tax responsibilities.

At the time the County filed its

crossclaim in the present action, the counties had no statutory right to challenge any decisions or procedures of the
commission.

It was only after the lower court ruled in

respondents' favor that the counties submitted proposed
legislation to obtain standing to get involved in appeals
before the Commission and subsequent court proceedings based
on those appeals.

Even then, the legislature limited the

standing of the counties to certain situations and did not
grant a broad power to challenge all Commission decisions or
proceedings.

See copies of Senate Bills Nos. 184 and 208

attached hereto as Appendix •A".

Passage of these bills con-

stitutes legislative recognition that counties can operate
only within the scope of powers granted to them by the legislature and that the counties did not have power or standing
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to challenge Commission valuations of state-assessed properi
in any way prior to adoption of these limited standing
statutes.
It would be improper in light of the Utah constitution
and statutes in existence when the present action was filed
to conclude that the counties had a right to sue the Commission to contest its valuation procedures.

The legislature,

as seen from a reading of applicable tax statutes as a whole,
clearly intended and recognized that the Commission could
carry out its supervisory functions without the direction,
supervision and second guessing of the counties, each of
which could be motivated by very different and conflicting
interests and objectives.

Under existing statutes, the coun-

ties also had no power to gain access to information used by
the Commission in discharging its constitutional duties,
including the valuation of state-assessed properties.

Nor

did they have any statutory right to file legal proceedings
to challenge the record-keeping practices and procedures
employed by the Commission.

The County's allegation that

they have the right and duty to make such challenges and to
obtain such information is founded on a misunderstanding of
their constitutional and statutory powers and is not supported by the law.

Only with full consideration by the

legislature of the questions of adequate safeguards, funding,
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s·oi>e of involvement, efficiency of administration and other
1 •.

-tors, should the counties be granted standing to get in-

volved in state-assessed property functions of the Commission.

Such questions were reviewed by the 1983 session of

the legislature when it granted the counties limited standing
to file court action against the Commission, only after the
counties had exhausted their administrative remedies before
the Commission and only within specific time limitations.

In

the absence of such legislation, the courts should not grant
standing to the counties to permit them to challenge actions
expressly required of state agencies and in which the counties have no statutory responsibility.
POINT II
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY APPELLANTS DO NOT
SUPPORT THEIR POSITION THAT THEY HAVE
STANDING TO CHALLENGE VALUATIONS MADE BY
THE STATE TAX
Appellants have cited several early Utah cases in support
of their position that they have standing to challenge action
taken by the Commission.

The issue of standing, however, was

not raised or discussed in any of those cases and, in any
event, all of the cases involved procedural issues arising
out of tax matters subject to concurrent state-county jurisdiction.

Several of the cases also involved taxpayers who

were parties to the action.

-21-

Appellants contend initially that the Commission's

sL,nl

ing argument relies on "Dillon's Rule,• which was
by this court in State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1980).

(Brief of Appellants, page 30).

Hutchinson, however,

does not apply to the issues before the Court in the present
case, since it holds only that when the state by statute
grants general welfare power to local governments, those
governments have authority beyond specific grants of power to
pass ordinances reasonably related to the objectives of the
general welfare power.

Id. at 1126.

In contrast, the

present case calls into question the counties' standing to
take legal action to challenge the Commission's exercise of
its statutory and constitutional duties to value specified
classes of property where no statute gives the counties any
power or responsibility with respect to the valuation of
those properties.
Appellants also cite Salt Lake County v. State Board of
Equalization, 55 P. 378 (Utah 1889), Juab County v. Bailey,
140 P. 764 (Utah 1914), Rich County v. Bailey, 154 P. 773
(Utah 1916), and Mammoth City v. Snow, 253 P. 680 (Utah
1926), in support of their position that local governments
have been permitted to challenge the validity of the Commission's actions.

Each of the above cases involved a challenge

by the plaintiff county to the Commission's apportionment of
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state-assessed property from one county to another, and such
app0rtionrnent was then used by the counties, as required by
statute, to apportion the taxpayer's property among taxing
districts within the counties.

The issues, therefore, were

strictly procedural and related to tax questions that involved concurrent state-county jurisdicton.

In contrast, the

issues in the present case do not involve such concurrent
jurisdiction and do not have an impact on the performance by
the counties of their statutory duties.

The Juab County case

is also distinguishable on the ground that it involved a
request by the county to force the Commission to grant it a
hearing.

Again, and most importantly, the issue of standing

to sue was not raised or discussed in any of the above cases.
Appellants also rely on a number of cases in which counties or local officials appealed to this Court from decisions
of the Commission which reversed decisions made by local
boards of equalization.

See,

Board of Equalization of

Kane County v. State Tax Commission, 50 P.2d 418 (Utah 1935):
Baker v. State Tax Commission, 520 P.2d 203 (Utah 1974): Salt
Lake County v. State Tax Commission, 532 P.2d 680 (Utah
1975).

These cases, however, are distinguishable on the

grounds that the question of standing was never raised and
each of them involved taxpayer appeals to the Commission in
connection with property valued and assessed by the counties
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and for which the counties had specific statutory duties
observed by the Court in Salt Lake County v. Tax Commiss__!_o"

r:.,

•these matters had their beginnings in applications
county-assessed property owners] with the Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization."

532 P.2d at 680.

When the Commis-

sion ruled in favor of the taxpayers, the counties appealed
to the courts, seeking to uphold the county board of equalization decisions.

The present case on the other hand, in-

volves property required by statute and the Constitution to
be valued by the Commission only; the counties have no statutory involvement or responsibilities in connection with such
valuations or subsequent appeals therefrom.
In Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 452 P.2d 876 (Utah
1960) , cited by appellants before the lower court but not in

their brief on appeal, elected county officers, in their
capacity as taxpayers and county officials, brought a declaratory action against the Commission for a determination,
among other thinqs, of whether the Commission's method for
revaluing county-assessed properties was valid.

As far as

the claims of the plaintiffs as taxpayers were concerned, the
challenge of the Commission's revaluation procedures was consistent with the statutory rights granted to taxpayers.

In

addition, the issues in the case related to matters subject
to concurrent state-county jurisdiction, since the subject
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properties were initially valued by the counties.

The plain-

tiffs also asked the Court to delineate the powers of local
officials and the general powers of the Commission to supervise local officers and boards, matters that are easily distinguishable from those before the Court in the present case.
In the remaining case of Washington County v. State Tax
Commission, 133 P.2d 564 (Utah 1943), cited by appellants,
the standing issue again was not raised.

The case involved a

writ of prohibition relating to a property tax exemption, and
several taxpayers were also parties to the action.

As with

other cases cited by appellants, this case does not deal with
a county's right to challenge action, which by statute and
the Constitution, is required to be taken exclusively by the
Commission, and for which the only statutory right of appeal
is granted to the taxpayer, not the counties.

It dealt

solely with the constitutionality of a tax statute and was in
the nature of a declaratory judgment.
In summary, the County has not cited any Utah cases in
which this Court has reviewed the question of whether or when
a county or its officials have standing to sue the Commission
and, more particularly, whether a county has standing to sue
the Commission to challenge its valuation of those properties
which fall under its exclusive jurisdiction.

When courts of

neighboring states have confronted these and similar issues,
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they have held unanimously that absent a statute to the

c0n

trary, counties lack standing to challenge Commission act,."
Finally, as a matter of policy, the counties and the
mission should not be adversaries in the administration of
the tax laws.

Both are charged with specific responsibili-

ties relating to valuation and assessment of certain classes
of taxable property in the state, and the Commission is
specifically charged with overseeing the counties in the performance of their duties with respect to property valuations
and assessments.

A reading of the tax statutes in effect

when Salt Lake County commenced the present action shows that
the legislature concluded that it was neither necessary nor
desirable for the counties to attempt to reverse those statutory roles.

Even with the passage of Senate Bill 208 in

1983, the legislature did not intend that the counties have
wholesale authority to challenge all Commission action.

It

limited the counties' rights in this regard and provided
specifically that an owner of state-asessed property or a
county dissatisfied with a valuation made by the Commission
could seek a hearing before the Commission on or before April
10th of the current tax year.

If the taxpayer or the county

disagreed with the Commission's decision, it could appeal
that decision to the district court.

It does not give a

county the right to file counterclaims and crossclaims like
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those asserted by the County in the present action where a
taxpa1er challenges the constitutionality of its property
tax, nor does it grant the right to a county to initiate
court proceedings before the matter is submitted to the Commission for a hearing.

To hold now that the appellants have

standing to maintain their crossclaims would be contrary to
the express statutory provisions in effect when those crossclaims were filed, and would not even be supported by the new
legislation.

It would also go against the position adopted

by this Court that assessments are susceptible of correction
only where the legislature has provided a remedy by statute.
See Juab County v. Bailey, 140 P.764, 766 (Utah 1914).

The

state law in effect at the time of commencement of the present action provided a judicial remedy for correction of
assessments and valuations and assessments to taxpayers only,
not to the counties and their political subdivisions.

The

counties had other means of input into Commission procedures
and decisions, including annual seminars and other meetings
to which county representatives were invited, committees or
panels appointed by the Governor to review valuation procedures, and various informal meetings.

Neither Salt Lake

County nor other counties within the state took advantage of
those opportunities to offer suggestions as to how they felt
certain classes of state-assessed properties should be
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valued.

The County, therefore, should not now be grante,l

standing to maintain legal action to challenge such valua
tions.
POINT III
APPELLANTS' CROSSCLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT FILED TIMELY.

In Juab County v. Bailey, 140 P.764, 766 (Utah 1914),
cited by appellants in their brief, this court held that the
counties were barred from bringing an action challenging
county by county apportionments made by the Commission of
state-assessed property, where the action had been brought
•after the apportionments [had] been made, the rate of taxation [had been] fixed in accordance with such apportionments,
and all levies [had] been made pursuant thereto."

Based on

this holding, appellants in the present case should be barred
from bringing any crossclaim to challenge property valuations
made by the Commission for 1981, since that crossclaim was
not filed until June 25, 1982, long after the valuations had
been made, the tax rates had been fixed, and the taxes had
been levied in accordance therewith.
S 59-10-26 (1953, as amended)

See Utah Code Annotated

(Property taxes to be paid by

November 30 of each calendar year).
This Court further held in Juab County that the counties
cannot commence action under the tax statutes after the
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Limitations period applicable to property owners has run.
140

P. at 76G.

In this regard, Section 78-12-31 of the Utah

Code requires that all actions for taxes paid under protest
be

within six months after payment of the tax.

Kennecott, the taxpayer in the present case, paid its tax
under protest on November 30, 1981.

Nearly seven months

passed, however, before appellants filed their crossclaim.
That crossclaim is therefore barred by the statute of
limitations.
POINT IV
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES PRECLUDE
APPELLANTS FROM OBTAINING THE INFORMATION
SOUGHT BY THEIR SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
Appellants' second cause of action is legally defective
on the further ground that it seeks to have the Court interfere with the taxpayers' constitutional right of privacy and
it violates the Archives and Records Service Information
Practices Act.

In Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah

1980), this Court recognized a constitutionally based right
of privacy with respect to records maintained by governmental
agencies.

In defining the scope of that right, the Court

stated:
It seems sufficient for our purpose herein to
say that what the right of privacy protects is to be
determined by applying the
accepted standards of social propriety.
This includes those
aspects of an individual's activities and manner of
living that would generally be regarded as being of
-29-

such personal and private nature as to belong to
himself and to be of no proper concern to others.
The right should extend to protect against intrusion
into or exposure of not only things which might
result in actual harm or damage, but also to things
which might result in shame or humiliation, or
merely violate one's pride in keeping his private
affairs to himself.
Id. at 1195.

In a concurring opinion in California Bankers

Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39
L.Ed.2d 812, Justice Lewis F. Powell indicated that financial
information should be protected by the constitutional right
of privacy:
Financial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations and beliefs. At some
point, governmental intrusion upon these would
implicate legitimate expectations of privacy.
The Commission has taken the position that the records
furnished to it by property owners, particularly information
relating to income, are most confidential and private.

To

release such information to political subdivisions and their
officers who have no right to value or supervise the valuation of property assessed by the Commission, would have a
detrimental effect on the Commission's ability to carry out
its assessment work and would needlessly reveal to the various county officials and employees information obtained in
confidence, without any reasonable purpose being served.
Based upon the taxpayer's legitimate expectation of privacy
with regard to certain financial information furnished to the
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'01nmission, the confidentiality of that information should be
upheld in order to prevent its dissemination to those who do
not need it for the performance of their duties.

In this

regard, the records sought by appellants have no bearing on
the county's ability to carry out its assessments and should
be used only by the Commission absent a specific statute to
the contrary.
Utah State law in effect when the County filed its crossclaim also precludes the disclosure of the information sought
by the County's second cause of action.

The Archives and

Records Service Information Practices Act found in Utah Code
Annotated, § 63-2-59,

(1981 Supp.), governs the main-

tenance and retention of state records and documents.

The

legislative intent behind the Act, among other things, is to
prevent abuse of personal or confidential information.
S 63-2-6.

Id.

With respect to individual rights under the Act,

Section 63-2-85.4(4) provides:
No confidential or private data shall be used other
than for the stated purposes nor shall it be disclosed to any person other than the individual to
whom the data pertains, without express consent of
that individual, except that next of kin may obtain
information needed to acquire benefits due a
deceased person.
Tax returns and other tax data furnished to or gathered by
the commission are classified as private data and, accordingly, may be used by the Commission only for the purpose of
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assessing taxes.

Appellants in the present action have p•0

sented no evidence that such records have not been so class 1
fied.

Since the counties have no statutory or constitutional

duties or responsibilities with respect to the valuation of
state-assessed properties, they are prevented by the Act from
having access to such data without the express permission of
the person supplying the data or to whom it pertains.

In

short, the constitutional right of privacy and the Utah
Archives and Records Service Information Practices Act bar
disclosure to appellants of the information sought by their
second cause of action.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the crossclaims of the county and the
other appellants in this case represent a serious attempt to
challenge the authority of the Commission, as well as the
entire system developed by the Commission under existing
statutes over a period of many years, for the valuation of
state-assessed properties.

Appellants seek through the liti-

gation process to participate in all matters involving the
authority, functions, policies and procedures of the Commission with respect to state-assessed properties, whereas Utah
statutes in effect when the crossclaim was filed grant exclusive responsibility to the commission in that area.

-32-

To per-

,nit appellants to become participants in the valuation of
state-assessed properties, without a statutory right to do
so, by means of the litigation process would make it impossible to carry out the Commission's functions without very
substantial costs, inefficiencies and other problems.

It

would also overburden the courts with issues that should properly be addressed by the legislature after full consideration of necessary safeguards and other matters, as was done
in the 1983 legislative session.
In short, the courts are not a proper forum for the
claims of a few county officials who are trying to assail the
general procedures and methods used by the Commission in
valuing state-assessed properties.

Other avenues of input by

the counties were available when the crossclaim was filed and
should have been utilized if appellants had wished to challenge the procedures, policies and valuation techniques of
the Commission.

Appellants' claims are matters to be con-

sidered by the legislature, as is well illustrated by the
limited standing laws passed by the legislature in 1983, or
to be handled by administrative procedures expressly provided
for by regulation or by special hearings conducted under
order of the governor's office.
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Appellants chose not to

avail themselves of those opportunities and should not

1,

considered to have standing to pursue those claims in co'",
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of July, 1983.
SNOW,

CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEA!J

Special Assistant Attorneys General and Attorneys for Respondent Utah State Tax Commission
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STATE
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RELATING

TO
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THIS

ACT

AMENDS SECTION 59-5-52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS

LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 71, LAWS OF
59-5-54,

59-5-55,

AND SECTION

AND 59-5-56,

59-5-109.6,

UTAH

UTAH

1982,

SECTIONS

CODE ANNOTATED 1953,
CODE

ANNOTATED

1953,

AS

ENACTED BY CHAPTER 233, LAWS OF UTAH 1981.

Be it

the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section

1.

Section 59-5-52, Utah Code An.notated 1953, ae

last amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1982,

By

59-5-52.

the

!1ret

day

of

April

comm1asion shall aseees, ae valued of January l,
required

by

law to be aeeeaeed by it.

ie

amended

to

state

tax

the
all

Immediately thereafter

the O'Wner, or operator ae provided in aection 59-5-65
property

ao

property

(2),

o!

aeee&aed and the aeeesaor for the county in which

property ie located ahall be notified of such aaaee•ment.
Section

2.

amended to read:

Section 59-5-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, ie

S. B. No. 184
59-5-54.

The state tax comrn1ss1on must prepare each yeeir

a book, to be called

Companies,"

in

"Record Aseeeement of Railroads and Ct.her

which must be entered

assessments of mines, made by it,

in

writing

•everal
the

each assessment, except

either 1n

or

bot.h

and printing, and the apportionment thereof to the

counties.

In such book must be

railroad, car,

atreet

entered the names

railroad, telegraph,

other 11nes and of all public ut1l1ties

of

telephone and

assessed

by

the

tax

comrn1ss1on, the names of the corporations to which, or the name

of the person or association to whom, the same

the

whole

number

of

miles

whom, the same were aseeseed,

were

aeeessed,

of the person or association to
the whole number of miles of the

railroad, car, street

telegraph,

telephone lines and

other lines in the &tate, the number of miles in each
assessment

county,

of all auch property, and the amount of

the

total

the

apportionment of such total

The

record assessment books and the information upon which the

assessments

and

apportionments

assessments to

are

each

calculated

county.

shall

for review by a county assessor, upon request.

available

be

E&ch

agent. employee, or other person acting under the control of

a

county assessor is sub1ect to the standards and requirements of
confidentiality in effect for the state tax commission and
not

release

any

taxpayer if auch person knows, or has reason to
release

of

the

confidentiality

believe,

exceed

$500,

that

information would significantly competitively

requirements of this section may be imprisoned

for a period not to exceed six months, fined in an
to

may

confidential proprietary information about a

or

both.

amount

not

In addition, such person shall be

dismissed from county office or employment, as the case may be,
and

ie

disqualified

from holding county office or emplo)'!!lent

for a period of five years.
Section

3.

Section 59-5-55, Utah Code Annotated 1953, i•

amended to read:
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B

No

184

59-5-55.

The state tax comn11esion must prepare each year

a book to be called "Record Assessment of
which

must

be

entered

the

organizat1on or corporation engaged in
the

value

of

all

upon

together

which
w1th

commission
The

they

such

may

value

any

Companies,"

every

utility

person,
business,

doing business within the
are

entitled

other

to earn a

lnformation

as

state

of

fair return;

the

tax

state

determine
of

the

util1ties with1n the

tangible

propert1es

of

the

public

state of Utah which are to be recorded in

the book to be called "Record

Assessment of Public Utilities,"

shall be determ1ned as follows:
year

of

the tangible and intangible properties of

said persons or companies
Utah

Utility

names

The

comm1ssion

shall

copy in said book from the last volume of the book

each
known

as "Record of Valuation of Utility Compan1es," prepared by
publlC

service

comm1esion,

properties of every publ.1c
state
of

the

valuations

utility

doing

business

which said properties are located :-Within

Utah.

Said

valuation

so

recorded

in

the

of the tangible
in

th1s

the boundaries
the

record

of

valuations of utility companies and copied by the commission in
the

book

known

as

Companies," shall be

of

of

Utility

accepted as the true and actual

value of

the tangible properties of
ccmrr.i ssion

aa1d utilities

Bhal 1 asse-ss t,.\..,e

from the valuations •o
recorded

Assessments

in

Utah,

of

recorded in

the

1.:.'tili ty

the •ame proportion to the

valuation as the assessed valuation of other tangible

properties aimilarly aasesaed bear to their actual
record

and

assessment

assessments
available

and

books

and

the

apportionments

are

value.

The

information upon which the
calculated

ah all

for rev1ew by a county assessor, upon request.

be
Each

agent, employee, or other person acting under the control cf

a

county assessor i• eubject to the etandards and requirement• cf
confidentiality in effect for the state tax commisaion and
not

release

any

may

confidential proprietary information about a
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taxpayer if euch pereon knows, or has reason to

releaee

of

the

dieadvantaqe

infonnat1on would s1qn1f1cantly compet1t1vely

the

confidentiality

turpayer

Any

person

for a period not to exceed six months
to

exceed

who

the

violates

requirements of this

_not
be

as the case may be,

for a

both.

amount

d1smiseed from county office or employment

ie

or

fined in an

In add1t1on,

and

$500,

disqualified
period

from holding county office or employment

f1ve

of

years.

(fttrtfteFl!'ere

com.m1ss1on

The

utility companies prepared by

the

public

every

service

Wtalii wktek

wttft!ft

shall

consider the record of valuations of

tfte

aft8

•e

eeeeee eet8

ae
e£

comm1ssion

aeeeeeee

.U..e

etete

e£

ef Wteft] in determining utility

rates in valuing the property for tax purposes.
Section

Section 59-5-56, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is

4.

111nended to read:
The state tax tommies1on must prepare each year

59-5-56.
a book called
Mines,"

in

the

"Occupation

which

and the assessment
aseeaament

by

of

it

and

all

mines

in

in

which

book

and

separate columns and

(1)

Tax

must be entered all

Aesessment

Book

the

state

must

eul:iject

under appropriate heads:

Owner of mine.
Name and description and location of the mine.

(3)

County in which it io oituated.

(4)

Net proceeds in dollars, 1! a metalliferous mine.
Number

of

lessee, contractor

(6)

Amount

aold the value
(7)

to

be specified in

(2)

(5)

of

occupation taxes fixed

tons

of ore mined vhether by the owner,

or otherwise.

received

for

thereof.

Value of mine.

-4-

ore and metal if aold; i ! not

s

B

]84

No

ma::h1nery

( 8)

\.'a 1 ue of the

( 9)

Value of supplies and other personal property.

Value of improvements.

(JO)

Value

(ll)

of

such

mines

or

mining

property

machinery,

improvements having a value

separate and

claims

aurf ace

and

lndependent

assessed

by

comm1ss1on, and the names of the owners of

the

of

all

state

tax

the aame.

Together w1 th such other informat1on as the tax comm1ss1on

may determine
The record assessment books and the information upon which

the assessments and
available

apportionments

are

calculated

shall

for review by a county assessor, upon request.

agent, employee,

be
Each

or other person act1ng under the control of

a

county aeseseor is subject to the standards and requirements of
confidentiality in effect for the state tax commission and
not

release

any

taxpayer if such person knows
release

of

the

disadvantage

or has reason to

believe,

the

taxpayer.

Any

person

who

violates

the

requirements of this section may be imprisoned

for a period not to exceed six months, fined in an
exceed

that

information would eigruficantly competitively

confidentiality

to

may

confidential proprietary infonnation about a

$500,

or

both.

In addition,

amount

not

such person shall be

dismissed from county office or employment, as the case may be,
and

ie

disaualified

from holdina county office or emolo'V'?Tlent

for a period of five years.
Section

5.

Section 59-5-109.6, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

as enacted by Chapter 233, Laws of Utah

1981,

is

amended

to

read:
59-5-109.6

( J)

Each

year,

to

assist

it

in

the

ef
evaluation

of

appraisal perfonnance of taxable real property,

the etate tax commission ehall conduct studies and publi•h
d1etribute

to

each

.!!!9

county aeseesor and others the reeulte of

etudiee of the relationahip between

-s-

the

aaaessed

and

market

S.

B. No.

values

184

of

property

to determine assessment-sales rat1os for

each type of taxable real
Every

property

within

taxing

districts.

gales-ratio study shall use the stat1st1cal method known

as the "weighted mean"' to
values,

and

the

determine the degree

"weighted
of

the

of

coeff1c1ent

d1 spers1on

Aeeeesors

"weighted tn£:Bn.
(2)

determine

or

of

var1&t1on"

may provide aales information

The state tax comrn1ss1on shall, before Decern.be1

each even-numbered year, order each county to adJust or
itl!!I

rates

assessment

prescribed in eect1on 59-5-1.

classes of properties.

shall also order

corrective

with

that

Such adJuetrnent or factoring may

include an entire county, geographical areas
aeparate

1 of

fBctor

using the most current etud1es so that

the assessment rate in each county is in accordance

and

tc

var1at1on

action

within

a

county

The etate tax commission
where

significant

value

deviations occur es indicated by the coefficient of dispersion.
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Bren: C

Overson

Oma:- E
At.'

Bunnell

REL ..t..TING TO HE.t.FINCE EEFC>?E THE TD: COMM!SSJOl\ Af\D Tr..x

ACT

AFFEJ..:..S FF\OM
DJSTFlCT

com..::y
BE

OF TriE ST.L.TE TA>: COMMlSSION TO

COUFT

OF

THE

SUFRE>:E

COUFT,

THE

PRO'JJD!NG THAT A

W}L,SE TAX RE\'ENUES ARE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION MJ\Y

Pl.RTY

IN

THE

MAY APPEAL OR PETITION FOR

HEAF!NG

RE\.' IE\<.' OF THE DEC l S

THJS

ACT

AMH.'DS SE:T!ON 59-7-:2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953,

LAS: .ri.¥.[;,':)ED BY CHAP:'EF 71,
UTAH
80,

LAWS

AS

1982, AA"D SECTION

ANt.'cTATED 1953,

AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER

LAWS OF UTAH 19-7

re Jt enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:

Section

Se:t1on 59-7-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,

last amended by Chapter 71,

Laws of Utah 1982,

lS

amended

tc

assessed

by

read:
If

59-7-12

the

the

owner

state tax commJss1on

of

any

property

te

or any

showing of reasonable cause ob1ects to the

WJth

either may, before the

hy
of

f

April,

county

assessment
tenth

day

apply to the commission rte kave
' t ekaii eet e

tke
Say ei

for! hearing

ef
eerreet

twefttyer

S. B. No. 208
!:t 7

W!:U\ tll.e

ef

or

c-o·.mty

thE-

ee ee te

etl'le!'

g_c,tL

etl'.!te)

!:ri

upcn

_cf__

ehal 1 be a} lowed tc _b_e_ _ _p_a.!...!_y_ at

any

under

th!: s

the
ob1ect1on from Aprll

comm1ss1on

may

)0 until Arr.ll 22.

1ncrease,

the cornrn1ss1on

At the

the tax

lower or susta1n the assessment,

an error in the

.

Section

if

or
w1 th

if

lt

is

other s1m11ar1 y

Section 59-24-2. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

enacted by Chapter 80, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read:
59-24-2.

W1th1n 30 days after notice of any dec1s1on

(1)

by the state tax commission rendered
before

after

a

formal

hearing

any aggrieved party appearing before the

or

whose tax revenues are affected by the

appeal

or

pet1t1on

for

rev1ew

to

the

dec1s1on

tax

may

of the

district court located in the county of res1dence or

pr1nc1pal

place of business of the affected taxpayer or, in the case of a
taxpayer whose
tax

division

are assessed on a statewide basis, to
of

the

the third Judicial district court in and for

Salt Lake County.
(2)
( l),

any

In all cases, whether or not proper under subsection
aggrieved

commit.blO:i.

or

decis1on may

county

party

appearing

whose

before

the

state

tax

reveDl:.eE" are

appeal or petition for review a decision rendered

after a formal hearing of the commission to the tax division of
the third judicial district court in and !or Salt

Lake

County

within the specified 30 days following notice of such decision.
(3)

In

the

a taxpayer may waive review and

trial de novo in the tax d1vis1on of the

district

court

and,

within the specified 30 days fol!ow1n9 the required notice, may
aeek review by the Utah Supreme Court upon writ of

-2-

certiorari.

B

If

No
a

2CJ8

chooGes to waive r19ht of

te.xi:-a:t-er

tax dn:1s1or1 of the dlStr1ct

by

f:::r

...::

£C-.1r.+,y m-.1st

taxpayer

in

:'t

(a)

tt.e
state

Sui: :er-e

court

and

•ppl1es

tf,e taxpayer or affected

in the appl1cat1or. for the writ that

the

2J__affected coun:__J is . . . a:'.·1ng the right of rev1e•• and

trial de novo in the tax d1vls1on of the dlstr1ct court and (b)
ccmply
14A-77,
the

tax

the

provisions of sec:1ons 59-5-78,

59-15-:6 and'or 59-lE-lJ as thcugh
d1'.·1.:J.on

of

re .. ·enues are affectej by
allowed

the dJ.str1ct court

59-13-48, 59-

seeking

=eview

in

A county whose tax

de::sJ.cn being reviewed

shall

be

to b€ a party in interest in the proceeding before the

Supreme ::curt
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